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For this special section of Emotion Review, the authors were 
asked to address three issues related to the role that the auto-
nomic nervous system (ANS) plays in emotion: (a) the degree to 
which different emotions are associated with different patterns 
of ANS activity; (b) the influence of ANS activity on subjective 
emotional experience; and (c) how to improve research in this 
area. The authors of the three articles share a longstanding 
involvement in research on the ANS and emotion, but represent 
quite different theoretical traditions and differ in how they study 
emotion. Thus, not surprisingly, the resulting articles differ 
markedly in the relative attention they give to each topic and in 
the ways the topics serve as jumping-off points into larger 
issues.
In reading the three articles together, I am struck by the lon-
gevity and durability that Darwin’s (1872) and James’ (1884) 
ideas on the specificity side and Cannon’s (1927) and Schachter 
and Singer’s (1962) ideas on the undifferentiated side have had 
in shaping this debate. This is all the more remarkable when one 
considers that Darwin, James, and Cannon did not produce sig-
nificant bodies of empirical research on the role of the ANS in 
emotion, and many critics have argued that Schachter and 
Singer’s classic study (Schachter & Singer, 1962) is seriously, 
and perhaps even fatally, flawed. It will be interesting to see if 
these historical figures continue to cast their spell over the new 
generation of emotion research, which still honors the important 
role the ANS plays in emotion, but is arguably much more 
focused on the brain and on the ways that emotion is regulated 
and recognized.
In the article by Norman, Berntson, and Cacioppo (2014), 
the authors take a relatively moderate position as to the level 
of empirical support for ANS specificity in emotion. They 
point to the considerable evidence that specificity exists, but 
note the inconsistencies in the nature of that specificity and its 
vulnerability to contextual influences. These authors work 
from a sophisticated model of emotion (the evaluative space 
model) that is unusual in its ability to accommodate both dis-
crete and dimensional approaches. Whatever one’s theoretical 
predilections, it is clear that humans are quite bilingual when 
it comes to the ability to think, talk about, and experience their 
emotions in both dimensional and discrete ways. A theoretical 
approach that allows the study of both in concert (rather than 
choosing one and excluding the other, or, even worse, lioniz-
ing one and vilifying the other) is critical for exploring the 
ways dimensions and discrete emotions interact. The authors 
also offer important theoretical insights about the ways that 
somatovisceral activity can shape emotional processes. Their 
somatovisceral afference model describes multiple pathways 
for this influence at ascending levels of the nervous system 
and envisions ways that the information from these pathways 
is represented and integrated.
Lang’s (2014) article is markedly less sanguine about the 
state of empirical support for ANS specificity, at least as it per-
tains to discrete emotions. Instead, he argues for specificity of a 
different kind, making a strong case that different patterns of 
ANS response are associated with two broad motivational 
states: (a) defensive, coping reactions to external threats, and 
(b) appetitive reactions to obtain rewards and address needs that 
are life sustaining. In his model, activation of the brain circuits 
associated with these motivational states contributes to subjec-
tive experience, but again not at the level of discrete emotions. 
Thus, activation of defensive circuitry evokes unpleasant/ 
aversive subjective states and activation of appetitive circuitry 
evokes pleasant/desirable subjective states. In his article, Lang 
provides a detailed description of the brain circuitry involved 
with these two motivational states and includes their links with 
ANS control systems in the brainstem, striatum, and other phy-
logenetically ancient brain regions.
Lang also points to a number of the intrinsic and arguably 
insoluble problems that plague research on “emotional feelings” 
(i.e., conscious emotional experience). He suggests that future 
research on the ANS in emotion would be better served by 
exploring the links that ANS activity has with particular pat-
terns of brain activity rather than with self-reported evaluations 
of emotional states. He also makes an interesting connection 
with recent attempts in the realm of psychopathology and men-
tal illness to define and study emotional disorders in terms of 
biomarkers and associated neural circuits rather than in terms of 
the traditional clinical syndromes that are based on subjective 
symptoms (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013).
Of the three contributors, I am probably the most sanguine 
about the likelihood that ANS specificity will ultimately be 
established (at least for a small set of discrete emotions). 
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However, having written about related issues recently in this 
journal (Levenson, 2011), I decided to do something different. 
Thus, in my article (Levenson, 2014), I consider two different 
kinds of patterning of ANS response in emotion that are found 
in most functionalist/evolutionary theories. One of these is 
ANS specificity, a theme in common with the other two papers. 
The other, equally important theoretically, is coherence, the 
capacity of emotion to mobilize and organize activity both 
within the ANS and between the ANS and other emotion 
response systems (e.g., facial expression, vocalization, motor 
behavior). For both coherence and specificity, I go back to first 
principles, describing the ways that these two kinds of ANS 
patterning are envisioned in theory and then discuss what 
research would look like that captures these conditions with 
the highest possible fidelity. With coherence research, I con-
clude that almost none of the existing studies have studied 
coherence in ways that are consistent with the theoretical 
accounts. Interestingly, among the few studies that have, quite 
high levels of coherence were found between the ANS and 
other response systems. With specificity research, there are 
certainly many excellent studies, but I conclude that the field 
would be well served by: (a) moving beyond its focus on con-
venient measures (i.e., heart rate and skin conductance), 
(b) including measures of ANS activity that have greater sig-
nal value for conspecifics (e.g., blushing, crying), (c) studying 
more intense emotions, (d) using more careful verification of 
emotional state, and (e) matching ANS physiology more pre-
cisely with the occurrence of emotion.
I hope that readers of this special section, both those who are 
already conducting research on the role of the ANS in emotion 
and those who will be conducting this kind of research in the 
future, will find these three articles to be useful, interesting, and 
thought-provoking. The many controversies and passionate 
debates that this research area has spawned over the decades 
serve as an eloquent statement of just how important these sci-
entific questions have been and will continue to be.
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